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 On a broadly retributive conception of blame and punishment, these 
attitudes and practices are fitting responses to wrongdoing for which the 
agent is culpable or responsible. Such a conception explains well the two 
principal defenses, both criminal and moral, that agents have available if 
blame or punishment threatens — justifications and excuses. Whereas a 
justification denies wrongdoing, an excuse denies culpability or respon-
sibility. Because excuses deny responsibility, conceptions of responsibil-
ity and excuse are interdependent. Conceptions of responsibility have 
implications for who should be excused, and conceptions of excuse have 
implications for the limits of responsibility.
 Accountability plays an important role in our understanding of moral 
and criminal responsibility. Though moral and criminal responsibility can 
be distinguished, they arguably have a common structure. One plausible 
view about the architecture of responsibility conceives of responsibility as 
requiring the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing, where that is conceived 
as factoring into requirements of normative competence — the ability to 
recognize and respond to moral and criminal norms — and situational 
control — the opportunity to act on one’s deliberations free from undue 
interference from others. Though not completely ecumenical, this approach 
is far from idiosyncratic and synthesizes familiar ideas from reasons-
responsive approaches to moral responsibility and fair choice approaches 
to criminal responsibility. According to this fair opportunity conception of 
responsibility, excuses also factor into two main kinds — those that deny 
normative competence and those that deny situational control. Insanity 
is the most familiar and widely accepted excuse denying normative com-
petence, though some people would also conceptualize immaturity and 
addiction as potential excuses involving impaired competence. Coercion 
and duress are the most familiar and widely accepted excuses denying 
situational control. Failures of either normative competence or situational 
control are arguably excusing, because either kind of failure deprives 
agents of the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing.
 In this essay, I want to focus on the role of normative competence in 
responsibility and excuse. It is plausible to factor normative competence 
into both cognitive and volitional capacities and to treat these two sets of 
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capacities as individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the relevant 
sort of competence. The fair opportunity conception of responsibility 
supports a conception of excuse that treats either cognitive or volitional 
impairment as the basis of an excuse, and this claim about excuse has im-
portant implications for our understanding of insanity and incompetence. 
 We can test and apply these claims about responsibility and incompe-
tence further by applying them to the question whether and, if so, under 
what conditions psychopathy excuses. Psychopathy is a vexed issue 
for several reasons. First, our reactive attitudes toward psychopaths are 
variable and sometimes ambivalent. The criminal law does not recog-
nize psychopathy as an excuse. Psychopaths do not present themselves 
as traditional incompetents who are delusional or incoherent. They are 
typically alert, intelligent, and frequently socially at ease, even charming. 
Psychopaths can display cruelty and malice and typically show no remorse 
for the harm they do. These characteristics of psychopathy explain why 
many are inclined to treat it as an aggravating, rather than mitigating or 
excusing, factor. On the other hand, several scholars have appealed to 
empirical studies of psychopaths and their psychological deficits to argue 
that they have significantly impaired normative competence that might 
justify excusing their wrongdoing. Our understanding of the jurisprudential 
significance of psychopathy is further complicated by the fact that em-
pirical work on psychopathy is still evolving and is currently unsettled in 
several respects. For these reasons, I cannot hope to resolve issues about 
the responsibility of psychopaths here. But the fair opportunity conception 
of responsibility, incompetence, and excuse can help to frame the debate 
about whether psychopathy can excuse in a constructive way. Moreover, 
there is, I will argue, good reason to be skeptical about whether we should 
recognize such an excuse at the present time, given what we now know 
about the nature of psychopathy.
 Debates about the responsibility of psychopaths reveal the ways in 
which cases of potential excuse raise questions at the intersection of moral 
philosophy, moral psychology, criminal jurisprudence, and empirical psy-
chology. The interdisciplinary nature of these issues explains part of their 
special interest, but it also brings risks. Because it is hard to be a master of 
all the relevant interdisciplinary perspectives, most of us seek to illuminate 
part of an interdisciplinary issue by focusing on the perspectives we know 
best and trying to educate ourselves about the ones we know less well. 
That is my aspiration here, to try to articulate one attractive conception of 
responsibility and excuse and then to explore how that perspective might 
help frame partly empirical debates about incompetence and psychopathy.
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1. Responsibility as the Fair Opportunity to Avoid Wrongdoing
 Here, I sketch a conception of the architecture of responsibility that 
draws on ideas in the reasons-responsive wing of the compatibilist tradition 
of thinking about free will and responsibility and ideas from the fair choice 
approach to criminal responsibility.2 On a broadly retributive view, blame 
and sometimes punishment are fitting responses to wrongdoing for which 
the agent is culpable or responsible. More specifically, blame and punish-
ment ought to be proportional to desert, which is itself the product of two 
independent variables — wrongdoing and culpability or responsibility.3 
P ∝ D (= W x R)
The retributivist formula should be understood as claiming only that cul-
pable wrongdoing is the desert basis for a pro tanto case for blame and 
punishment. That is, a plausible form of retributivism should allow that its 
desert-based rationale for blame and punishment can sometimes compete 
with and sometimes lose out to non-desert-based rationales against blame 
and punishment, appealing to factors such as mercy or forgiveness.4
 This sort of broadly retributive view explains well the two main kinds 
of defense an agent might offer when blame or punishment threatens 
— justifications and excuses. Justifications deny wrongdoing, whereas 
excuses deny culpability or responsibility. Just as justification is the 
flipside of wrongdoing, so too excuse is the flipside of responsibility. 
These defenses are part of the criminal law but also reflect well the moral 
landscape. When others threaten to blame us morally, it can be appropriate 
to respond citing factors that would justify or excuse our behavior. Our 
focus here is on responsibility and excuse. Excuses provide a window onto 
responsibility, and our conceptions of excuse and responsibility should 
have corresponding structure.
 If someone is to be culpable or responsible for her wrongdoing, then 
she must be a responsible agent. Our paradigms of responsible agents 
are normal mature adults who are normatively competent. They must be 
able to distinguish between the intensity and authority of their desires 
and impulses. This requires that agents not simply act on their strongest 
desires, but be capable of stepping back from their desires, evaluating 
them, and acting for good reasons. If so, normative competence involves 
reasons-responsiveness, which itself involves both cognitive capacities to 
distinguish right from wrong and volitional capacities to conform one’s 
conduct to that normative knowledge.
 It is important to frame this approach to responsibility in terms of 
normative competence and the possession of these capacities for reasons-
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responsiveness. In particular, responsibility must be predicated on the 
possession, rather than the use, of such capacities. We do excuse for lack 
of competence. We do not excuse for failures to exercise these capacities 
properly. Provided the agent had the relevant cognitive and volitional 
capacities, we do not excuse the weak-willed or the willful wrongdoer for 
failing to recognize or respond appropriately to reasons. If responsibility 
were predicated on the proper use of these capacities, we could not hold 
weak-willed and willful wrongdoers responsible for their wrongdoing. 
Indeed, the fact of wrongdoing would itself be exculpatory, with the absurd 
result that we could never hold anyone responsible for wrongdoing. It is 
a condition of our holding wrongdoers responsible that they possessed 
the relevant capacities.
 Normative competence, on this conception, involves two forms of 
reasons-responsiveness: an ability to recognize wrongdoing and an ability 
to conform one’s will to this normative understanding. Both dimensions 
of normative competence involve norm-responsiveness. As a first ap-
proximation, we can distinguish moral and criminal responsibility at least 
in part based on the kinds of norms to which agents must be responsive. 
Moral responsibility requires capacities to recognize and conform to 
moral norms, including norms of moral wrongdoing, whereas criminal 
responsibility requires capacities to recognize and conform to norms of 
the criminal law, including norms of criminal wrongdoing.
 Normative competence requires the cognitive capacity to make suit-
able normative discriminations, in particular, to recognize wrongdoing. If 
so, then we can readily understand one aspect of the criminal law insanity 
defense. As we will see, a full account of the elements of insanity is con-
troversial. But most plausible versions of the insanity defense include a 
cognitive dimension, first articulated in the M’Naghten rule that excuses 
if the agent lacked the capacity to discriminate right from wrong at the 
time of action.5
 But there is more to normative competence than this cognitive capac-
ity. It is a common view that intentional action is the product of informa-
tional states, such as beliefs, and motivational states, such as desires and 
intentions. Though our beliefs about what is best can influence our desires, 
producing optimizing desires, our desires are not always optimizing. Some-
times they are good-dependent but not optimizing, when they are directed 
at lesser goods, and sometimes they are completely good-independent. 
This is reflected in cases of weakness of will in which we have beliefs 
about what is best (and perhaps optimizing desires) but in which we act 
instead on the basis of independent non-optimizing passions and desires. 
This psychological picture suggests that being a responsible agent is not 
merely having the capacity to tell right from wrong but also requires 
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the capacity to regulate one’s actions in accordance with this normative 
knowledge. This kind of volitional capacity requires emotional and appeti-
tive capacities to enable one to form intentions based on one’s practical 
judgments about what one ought to do and execute these intentions over 
time, despite distraction, temptation, and other forms of interference. 
 If one’s emotions and appetites are sufficiently disordered and outside 
one’s control, this might compromise volitional capacities necessary for 
normative competence. Consider the following obstacles to volitional 
competence.
• Irresistible desires or paralyzing fears that are neither con-
querable nor circumventable, as perhaps in some cases of 
genuine agoraphobia or addiction.6
• Clinical depression that produces systematic weakness of 
will in the form of listlessness or apathy.
• Acquired or late onset damage to the prefrontal cortex of the 
brain in which agents have considerable difficulty conform-
ing to their own judgments about what they ought to do, as 
in the famous case of Phineas Gage.7
Each of these cases involves significant volitional impairment in which 
agents experience considerable difficulty implementing or conforming to 
the normative judgments they form. 
 As we will see, recognition of a volitional dimension of normative 
competence argues against purely cognitive conceptions of insanity, such 
as the M’Naghten test, which recognizes only cognitive deficits as the basis 
for insanity, and in favor of a more inclusive conception that recognizes 
an independent volitional dimension to sanity and so recognizes a wider 
conception of insanity as involving significant impairment of either cogni-
tive or volitional competence.
 Both cognitive and volitional competence involve sensitivity to 
reasons. But sensitivity is a scalar notion. This raises the question how 
responsive someone needs to be to be responsible. This is an important and 
difficult issue, deserving more careful discussion than I can give it here. 
We might begin by distinguishing different grades of responsiveness.8 We 
can specify the degree to which an agent is responsive to reasons in terms 
of counterfactuals about what she would believe or how she would react 
in situations in which there was sufficient reason for her to do otherwise.9 
An agent is more or less responsive to reason depending on how well her 
judgments about what she ought to do and her choices would track her 
reasons for action. Initially, we might distinguish two extreme degrees of 
responsiveness.
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• Strong Responsiveness: Whenever there is sufficient reason 
for the agent to act, she recognizes the reason and conforms 
her behavior to it.
• Weak Responsiveness: There is at least one situation in which 
there is a sufficient reason to act, and the agent recognizes 
that reason and conforms her behavior to it.
However, it does not seem plausible to model normative competence in 
terms of either strong or weak responsiveness. 
 Strong responsiveness is too strong for the same reason we gave for 
focusing on competence, rather than performance. We do not require that 
people actually act for sufficient reasons; it is the capacities with which 
they act that matter. The weak-willed are, at least typically, responsible 
for their poor choices. Indeed, since strongly reasons-responsive agents 
always recognize and conform to reasons, they would never act wrongly. 
But that would make wrongdoing per se excusing, which would prevent 
us from ever holding wrongdoers responsible. 
 Moreover, weak responsiveness seems too weak. It treats someone as 
responsive in the actual situation even if she did not respond in the actual 
situation and there is only one extreme circumstance in which she would 
recognize and respond to reasons for action. Suppose that the agoraphobe’s 
phobia is so irresistible that she could only resist it under imminent threat 
of death. Should she be regarded as normatively competent in situations 
involving lesser threats? For instance, should she be held responsible for 
not leaving her house if this was the only way to prevent a minor property 
crime? Weak responsiveness seems too weak. 
 The Goldilocks standard of responsiveness evidently lies somewhere 
between these extremes. Of course, there is considerable space between 
the extremes – the gap between always and once. We might stake out an 
intermediate form of responsiveness.
• Moderate Responsiveness: Where there is sufficient reason 
for the agent to act, she regularly recognizes the reason and 
conforms her behavior to it.
Moderate responsiveness is deliberately vague; it specifies a range or 
space of counterfactuals that must be true for the agent to be suitably 
responsive. Ideally, we would be able to specify a preferred form of mod-
erate responsiveness more precisely. But what is important, for present 
purposes, is that reasons-responsiveness is a matter of degree and that 
the right threshold for responsibility involves some kind of regularity in 
tracking and conforming to one’s reasons.
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 An important part of an agent’s being responsible for wrongdoing 
that she chose and intended consists in her being a responsible agent. This 
we have conceptualized in terms of normative competence and analyzed 
into cognitive and volitional capacities. Evidence for this view is that one 
seems to have an excuse, whether complete or partial, if one’s normative 
competence is compromised in significant ways. Some of the most familiar 
kinds of potential excuse – insanity, immaturity, and uncontrollable urges 
– involve compromised normative competence. 
 But there is more to an agent being culpable or responsible for her 
wrongdoing than her being responsible and having intentionally engaged 
in wrongdoing. Excuse is not exhausted by denials of normative compe-
tence. Among the factors that may interfere with our reactive attitudes, 
including blame and punishment, are external or situational factors. In 
particular, coercion and duress may lead the agent into wrongdoing in 
a way that nonetheless provides an excuse, whether full or partial. The 
paradigm situational excuse is coercion by another agent, as when one 
is threatened with physical harm to oneself or a loved one if one doesn’t 
participate in some kind of wrongdoing, for instance, driving the getaway 
car in a robbery. The Model Penal Code adopts a reasonable person 
version of the conditions under which a threat excuses, namely, when 
a person of reasonable firmness would have been unable to resist, pro-
vided the actor was not himself responsible for being subject to duress.10 
Though criminal law doctrine focuses on threats that come from another’s 
agency, hard choice posed by natural forces seems similarly exculpatory, 
as in Aristotle’s famous example of the captain of the ship who must jet-
tison valuable cargo in dangerous seas caused by an unexpected storm 
(Nicomachean Ethics 1110a9-12). Situational duress does not compromise 
the wrongdoer’s status as a responsible agent and does not challenge her 
normative competence, but it does challenge whether she is responsible 
for her wrongdoing.11
 So far, the conception of responsibility emerging here is a two-factor 
model twice over. Responsibility is factored into normative competence 
and situational control, and normative competence is factored into cogni-
tive and volitional capacities. This kind of two-factor model seems plau-
sible, in significant part because it promises to fit our practices of excuse 
in both moral assessment and the criminal law pretty well. Perhaps this 
is adequate justification. But it would be nice if there were some unifying 
element to its structure.
 One possible umbrella concept is control. Freedom from coercion 
and duress, cognitive competence, and volitional competence all seem to 
be aspects of an agent’s ability to control her actions. But control seems 
important, at least in part, because it seems unfair to blame agents for 
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outcomes that are outside their control. This suggests that the umbrella 
concept should be fairness, in particular, the fair opportunity to avoid 
wrongdoing, because failure of either normative competence or situ-
ational control violates the norm that blame and punishment be reserved 
for those who had a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. If we treat the 
fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing as the key to responsibility, we get 
the following picture of the architecture of responsibility.
One way to see the importance of the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing 
is to think about why strict liability is problematic. Strict liability offenses 
are those for which wrongdoing is sufficient for blame and punishment 
and culpability is not required. It may be acceptable to impose liability 
without culpability in civil (tort) law. But in those parts of law and mor-
als where we are interested in accountability, the idea of liability without 
culpability is problematic. In particular, broadly retributivist practices that 
condition blame and punishment on culpable wrongdoing must object to 
strict liability as unfair.12 
2. Excuse, Incompetence, and Insanity
 Part of the appeal of understanding responsibility in terms of the fair 
opportunity to avoid wrongdoing is that it explains well the two main 
kinds of excuse — those that deny normative competence and those that 
deny situational control. Whereas insanity, immaturity, and uncontrol-
lable urges involve compromised normative competence, coercion and 
duress compromise the agent’s opportunity to exercise her normative 
competence. If either normative competence or situational control is 
significantly compromised, this compromises the agent’s fair opportunity 
to avoid wrongdoing. In the remainder of this essay, I want to consider 
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how we should understand failures of normative competence and whether 
psychopaths are incompetent in the requisite way.
 In discussing excuses, in general, and incompetence excuses, in 
particular, some philosophers distinguish between excuses and exemp-
tions.13 The prototypical case of an exemption is a case in which an actor 
is not responsible for what he did because of quite general impairments 
of his agency. So, for instance, insanity and immaturity are sometimes 
described as exemptions. By contrast, excuses are sometimes claimed to 
be prototypically case-specific in which the agent is otherwise normal 
and responsible but suffered some kind of momentary lapse or interfer-
ence, perhaps due to exhaustion or temporary dementia brought on by 
severe dehydration. But we should be careful about treating exemptions 
and excuses as disjoint classes. For one thing, the criminal law includes 
all claims to less than full culpability in the single category of excuse. 
Moreover, there are intermediate cases. Indeed, immaturity might affect 
a broad range of decision-making, but, while not episodic, nonetheless is 
temporary and eventually outgrown. Psychoses might also be generally 
incapacitating but temporary in duration if they can be treated effectively 
with medication. Whether temporary or long lasting, irresistible urges and 
paralyzing emotions may be selective in the way they undermine an agent’s 
practical reasoning. For these reasons, exemptions are best understood as 
comparatively global or standing excuses.
 Moral responsibility presupposes normative competence with respect 
to moral norms. It requires agents to be able to recognize moral norms 
and distinguish moral right from wrong and to be able to conform their 
behavior to this moral knowledge. Significant impairment of either cog-
nitive or volitional competence would be the basis for an incompetence 
excuse. My sense is that our assessments of moral responsibility and 
excuse are potentially sensitive in two ways. First, our assessments of 
moral responsibility are in principle open to various kinds of impairment of 
competence. Multiple personality disorder, psychosis, severe depression, 
immaturity, addiction, irresistible impulses, and paralyzing fears might 
all compromise moral competence. The relevant question is whether they 
involve a significant enough impairment of cognitive or volitional abilities. 
For the most part, our moral assessments recognize these as open and at 
least partly empirical questions. Second, our moral assessments generally 
recognize that responsibility and excuse are scalar, because moral com-
petence itself is scalar. Cognitive and volitional competence are matters 
of responsiveness, which is itself a matter of degree. Impairments can be 
partial, making it unusually hard, but not literally impossible, for some 
agents in some circumstances to recognize moral norms or to conform to 
them. In such cases, where the determinants of responsibility and excuse 
10
are themselves a matter of degree, so too can responsibility and excuse 
be partial. Our moral assessments can recognize partial responsibility and 
be multivalent.
 Criminal responsibility presupposes normative competence with 
respect to norms of the criminal law. It too would seem to require both 
cognitive and volitional competence — the cognitive capacity to recog-
nize criminal norms and distinguish lawful and unlawful behavior and 
the volitional capacity to conform one’s behavior to these norms, despite 
distraction and temptation. By contrast with our assessments of moral 
responsibility, assessments of criminal responsibility are more coarse-
grained. First, the criminal law’s only incompetence excuse is insanity. A 
putative form of incompetence must qualify as insanity to be excusing in 
American criminal law. That assumption could put pressure on the criminal 
law to employ an expansive conception of insanity, so as not to leave out 
any potential incompetence excuses, but it may also lead to a restrictive 
conception of incompetence excuses. Second, for the most part, American 
criminal law does not recognize degrees of responsibility and excuse or 
partial responsibility and excuse.14 Our criminal system is generally biva-
lent, treating agents as either responsible or non-responsible. Presumably, 
the criminal law recognizes that the capacities underlying competence and 
sanity are scalar in nature, but insists, perhaps on pragmatic grounds, that 
we privilege certain degrees of normative competence as necessary and 
sufficient for responsibility and excuse. There is an important question, 
which we will examine shortly, of where to set these thresholds. Those 
above the threshold are responsible and have no excuse, and those below 
the threshold are not responsible and have a full excuse. The natural worry 
about such a bivalent approach is that the threshold will be arbitrary and 
doesn’t recognize important differences above and below the threshold. 
In particular, a bivalent system gives rise to worries about being overly 
punitive for punishing those with significant impairments that fall below 
the level required for a full excuse just as severely as those with no sig-
nificant impairments at all. This is a potential worry about criminal justice 
systems that do not recognize a doctrine of partial excuse. But even in 
such systems, the same facts about diminished capacity that would justify 
partial excuse in a multivalent system can and should operate as mitigat-
ing factors at sentencing. Mandatory sentencing schemes are problematic 
insofar as they compromise the retributive rationale for individual desert 
and prevent the recognition of partial excuses as mitigating factors. 
 While I am interested in moral responsibility, as well as criminal 
responsibility, and eventually want to explore ways in which they might 
interact, I want to focus in the rest of this section on what the fair op-
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portunity conception of responsibility implies about the way we should 
conceive of the insanity defense. 
 The evolution of the insanity defense has not been linear. Simplifying 
somewhat, the main debate has been whether sanity is just a matter of 
cognitive competence, with the result that the insanity excuse should in-
volve a purely cognitive impairment, or whether sanity includes volitional 
competence as well, in which case insanity could take the form of cognitive 
or volitional impairment. These two different conceptions are represented 
by the M’Naghten test and by the Model Penal Code test, respectively.15 
It is significant that, at least conceptually, the M’Naghten test represents 
a narrower conception of excuse than the Model Penal Code. Prior to 
adoption of the Model Penal Code, the purely cognitive M’Naghten test 
was the dominant conception of insanity in Anglo-American criminal law. 
But the Model Penal Code introduced a broader conception of agency 
and responsibility, one that recognized that responsibility has volitional, 
as well as cognitive, elements. Here, as elsewhere, the Model Penal 
Code proved incredibly influential, leading many jurisdictions in the 
United States to abandon the narrower M’Naghten test for the broader 
MPC test. However, this trend changed dramatically in the wake of John 
Hinckley’s acquittal in 1982 on grounds of insanity for the attempted 
murder of President Ronald Reagan. Public outcry over the verdict led 
to a backlash against the MPC test and a return in many jurisdictions to a 
narrower M’Naghten-style conception of insanity. Though the backlash 
was neither principled nor empirically well informed, it has reshaped 
the insanity defense in American jurisdictions with 52% of states now 
employing a purely cognitive conception and only 40% now employing 
a cognitive and volitional conception.16
 Some interpret the M’Naghten test to ask whether the agent did in 
fact know that what she was doing was wrong.17 However, as the fair op-
portunity conception of responsibility implies, lack of knowledge shouldn’t 
be excusing if the agent could have known that what she was doing was 
wrong. The more common understanding of M’Naghten focuses on cogni-
tive competence, not performance. For instance, the Federal insanity test, 
adopted in the post-Hinckley era, reflects this interpretation of M’Naghten.
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal 
statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting 
the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease 
or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or 
the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not 
otherwise constitute a defense.18 
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One interesting issue, which we will return to later, is whether the wrong-
doing that is the object of the cognitive competence is legal or moral. The 
most natural assumption, I think, for purposes of a doctrine of criminal 
responsibility and excuse would be to require that the agent have had the 
capacity to recognize behavior as unlawful or criminal. But the issue is 
contested. Britain has resolved this ambiguity in favor of legal wrongdo-
ing, but American jurisdictions remain divided over the issue, specifying 
it one way in some jurisdictions, the other way in others, and letting courts 
resolve the matter in others.
 Article 4 of the Model Penal Code deals with responsibility. §4.01 
deals with Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility.
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the 
time of such conduct as a result of a mental disease or defect 
he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality 
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law. (2) As used in this Article, the terms “mental 
disease or defect” do not include an abnormality manifested only 
by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct. 
The Model Penal Code insanity test leaves it to legislative discretion 
to specify whether the wrongdoing in question is legal or moral. Like 
M’Naghten, it requires that the relevant incapacities be due to mental 
disease or defect and that there be independent evidence of this disease 
or defect, apart from the wrongdoing itself. Despite these commonalities, 
the MPC test differs from M’Naghten in several ways. In particular, it is 
conceptually broader than M’Naghten in three ways.
 First, the most important difference is that whereas M’Naghten has 
a purely cognitive conception of responsibility, the MPC conception is 
cognitive and volitional. The MPC requires that responsible agents not 
only be able to recognize wrongdoing but also be able to conform their 
conduct to this normative knowledge. Since both cognitive and volitional 
competence are required, significant impairment of either is excusing. This 
contrasts with the narrower M’Naghten conception, which recognizes only 
cognitive impairments as excusing.
 Second, the Model Penal Code says that one is insane if one lacks a 
substantial capacity, whether cognitive or volitional. This also contrasts 
with traditional understandings of M’Naghten that say, in effect, that one 
must be completely lacking in (cognitive) capacity to qualify as insane. 
Someone who had minimal cognitive competence might well qualify as 
sane under M’Naghten but as insane under the Model Penal Code. MPC 
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applies this same substantial capacity analysis to volitional, as well as 
cognitive, capacities.
 Finally, the Model Penal Code requires that the defendant be able to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct. It is not immediately clear if 
this is different from the M’Naghten requirement to be able to recognize 
the wrongfulness of her conduct. These could be viewed as equivalent 
formulations. But one might doubt that they are equivalent and think that 
the MPC introduces a further requirement. By analogy, one might think 
that one could recognize a fine wine, perhaps without ever tasting it, but 
that one could only appreciate that a wine was fine if one had tasted it 
and/or had some sense of what made it fine. Similarly, one might be able 
to recognize behavior as unlawful or morally wrong without any appre-
ciation or understanding of what makes it unlawful or morally wrong. 
On this view, appreciation requires at least a rudimentary understanding 
of why, as well as that, something is wrong. So it may not be enough to 
be aware that the conduct is wrong if one doesn’t have a sense of what 
makes it wrong. We might say appreciation involves knowing not only that 
something is wrong but also something about why it is wrong. Whereas 
M’Naghten’s knowledge requirement involves a fairly thin kind of un-
derstanding, MPC’s appreciation requirement arguably involves a thicker 
kind of understanding. Even if appreciation is a further requirement, there 
is a question whether it is a reasonable further requirement to place on 
sanity.
3. Fair Opportunity, Insanity, and Incompetence
 As between M’Naghten and Model Penal Code conceptions of in-
sanity or incompetence, the fair opportunity conception of responsibility 
favors something much closer to the MPC conception. However, we will 
see that there are reasons to broaden the MPC conception in two ways 
and narrow it in another.
 First and foremost, the fair opportunity conception of responsibility 
favors a conception of an incompetence excuse that recognizes volitional 
as well as cognitive impairment as excusing, precisely because cognitive 
competence and volitional competence are individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient for an agent to be responsible. The Model Penal Code 
conception of insanity is an important advance on the M’Naghten concep-
tion, precisely because it recognizes an independent volitional dimension 
to sanity and so recognizes a wider conception of insanity as involving 
significant impairment of either cognitive or volitional competence. A 
failure of either kind of competence compromises the offender’s fair op-
portunity to avoid wrongdoing. 
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 It might be appropriate here to consider one kind of skepticism 
about the bearing of volitional competence on insanity. Stephen Morse 
has expressed skepticism about the criminal law recognizing volitional 
impairment as an independent ground of excuse, and his skepticism is 
especially interesting, because he is otherwise sympathetic with a fair 
choice conception of criminal responsibility that is similar to the fair 
opportunity conception defended here. In his essay “Uncontrollable 
Urges and Irrational People,” Morse critically discusses proposals to treat 
wrongdoers with irresistible impulses as excused for lack of control. He 
claims, not implausibly, that many with emotional or appetitive disorders 
are nonetheless responsible, because they retain sufficient capacity for 
rationality (1040). In discussing excuses that appeal to uncontrollable 
urges, he makes clear that his conception of rationality excludes volitional 
components (1054). But why should we abandon a volitional dimension 
to normative competence and control? Morse focuses on the alleged threat 
posed by irresistible urges and makes several different claims about them: 
(1) we cannot make sense of irresistible urges, (2) we cannot distinguish 
between genuinely irresistible urges and urges not resisted, (3) there are 
no irresistible urges, because under sufficient threat of sanction we can 
resist any strong urge.
 Morse’s focus on irresistible urges is already problematic, because 
it ignores the varieties of volitional impairment, which include not just 
irresistible urges but also paralyzing fears, depression, and systematic 
weakness caused by damage to the prefrontal cortex. 
 First, Morse suggests that the idea of irresistible urges is not coherent 
(1062). We simply have no idea what it would be for an urge or desire to be 
irresistible. But there seems to be no conceptual problem with irresistible 
urges. We can conceive of paralyzing emotions or irresistible desires, as 
emotional states or appetites that stand in the way of implementing the 
verdicts of practical reason — states and appetites that are unconquerable 
and uncircumventable. Resistibility is a modal notion. There is a ques-
tion about how unconquerable or uncircumventable impulses must be to 
be excusing, and there may be evidential or pragmatic problems about 
identifying desires that are genuinely irresistible. But the concept of ir-
resistible desires does not seem especially problematic.
 Second, Morse claims that even if we could make sense of irresistible 
urges, we could not distinguish between irresistible urges and urges not 
resisted (1062). This is the problem of distinguishing between can’t and 
won’t. First of all, this is an evidentiary problem, not a claim about the 
ingredients of normative competence. Moreover, this evidentiary problem 
seems no worse than the one for the cognitive dimension of normative 
competence, which requires us to distinguish between a genuine inability 
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to recognize something as wrong and a failure to form correct normative 
beliefs or attend to normative information at hand. Making the distinction 
between can’t and won’t is a challenge, but not an insurmountable one, in 
either the cognitive or volitional case. It requires that we ascertain whether 
the agent was moderately reasons-responsive. For instance, there are neu-
rophysiological tests for various forms of affective, as well as cognitive, 
sensitivity, such as electrodermal tests of empathetic responsiveness.19 And 
a sufficiently consistent history of weakness of will would be evidence of 
problems of volitional control.
 Finally, Morse claims that even if we could distinguish can’t and 
won’t, we would find that in actual cases the urges in question are almost 
always resistible. In discussing whether an addict’s cravings are irresist-
ible, Morse argues that they are not because if you hold a gun to the ad-
dict’s head and tell him that you’ll shoot him if he gives in, he can resist 
(1057-58, 1070). This is reminiscent of the sort of weak responsiveness 
that Kant requires in The Critique of Practical Reason.
Suppose that someone says his lust is irresistible when the desired 
object and opportunity are present. Ask him whether he would 
not control his passion if, in front of the house where he had 
this opportunity, a gallows were erected on which he would be 
hanged immediately after gratifying his lust. We do not have to 
guess very long what his answer would be.20
 
Morse and Kant believe that volitional capacity is easily demonstrated 
insofar as agents can always resist desires and temptations under sufficient 
threat. In effect, this claim about the volitional dimension of normative 
competence is that one can’t have weak responsiveness without having 
moderate responsiveness. Anyone who can resist an urge in one extreme 
situation can resist it in others. But there seems to be no good reason to 
accept this psychological stipulation. An agoraphobe might have such a 
paralyzing fear of public spaces that she would be induced to leave her 
home only under imminent threat of death. There is no reason to assume 
that we cannot have weak responsiveness without moderate responsive-
ness.
 Weak responsiveness seems implausible as a general condition on 
responsibility. Cases in which a person would only react differently under 
a threat of imminent death, because of a paralyzing fear or compulsion, 
for example, seem to be cases in which we should excuse.21 If a desire 
is really only resistible in this one counterfactual case, then that seems 
to be a good reason for thinking that the agent is not responsible, or at 
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least not fully responsible, in the actual case in which she failed to resist 
a significantly smaller threat. 
 On closer inspection, it seems Morse is really ambivalent between two 
different kinds of skepticism about the volitional dimension of normative 
competence and its significance. In some moments, he denies that there is 
any separate volitional dimension to normative competence, beyond the 
cognitive dimension. At other times, he recognizes the need for a separate 
volitional dimension but claims that it is easily satisfied because volitional 
conformity to what one judges right and wrong is all of a piece. Neither 
form of skepticism is especially promising. 
 This discussion about the degrees of reasons-responsiveness is also 
relevant to assessing the second distinctive feature of the Model Penal 
Code conception of insanity. Whereas M’Naghten requires complete 
cognitive incapacity for excuse, the MPC requires only substantial inca-
pacity, whether cognitive or volitional. We can recast this difference in 
terms of reason-responsiveness. Whereas M’Naghten requires only weak 
responsiveness, the MPC arguably requires moderate-responsiveness. 
Someone who was only weakly responsive to wrongdoing in the sense 
that she was rarely able to recognize wrongdoing and only under unusual 
circumstances, remote from her actual circumstances, would qualify as 
sane under M’Naghten but might well qualify as insane under the Model 
Penal Code. The substantial capacity test is strengthened if we remember 
that the criminal law is bivalent in its verdicts. In ideal criminal theory, in 
which we were perfectly reliable about determining just deserts, respon-
sibility and excuse should be scalar and track the degree of normative 
competence. But it seems likely that criminal law doctrine, as we have 
it, was designed for non-ideal theory, perhaps because of doubts about 
the ability of courts to reliably track small differences in culpability. At 
least, this is one rationale for a binary system that treats responsibility and 
excuse as all or nothing and sets a threshold of competence above which 
the agent is fully responsible and below which she is fully excused, even 
when the determinants of responsibility are themselves scalar. The use 
of thresholds here must be somewhat arbitrary, forcing us to treat A and 
B as equally responsible even if A is barely above the threshold and B is 
well above it. If we set the threshold very low, then a great many who are 
marginally responsible will be treated as fully responsible. If, as many 
believe, it is more unjust to over-punish than to under-punish, then we 
have special reason not to set the threshold too low.22 So, as long as we 
operate in a binary system that does not recognize partial responsibility 
and excuse, there is a good argument for setting the threshold at substan-
tial capacity, as the Model Penal Code does, rather than bare capacity, as 
M’Naghten does.
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  It’s harder to know what the fair opportunity conception of respon-
sibility implies about the Model Penal Code requirement that the agent 
be able to appreciate the quality of his act and its wrongfulness, in part 
because it is hard to know whether appreciation should be understood as 
a further requirement beyond recognition of wrongfulness. The greater 
the gap between the sort of understanding required by appreciation and 
recognition, the more significant the appreciation requirement. But the 
more significant the gap, the harder it is to justify a separate appreciation 
requirement. The fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing requires agents 
to be able to discriminate right from wrong and recognize wrongdoing. 
Perhaps because the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing requires that 
the agent be able to recognize when wrongdoing is justified, for instance, 
as permission to do the lesser evil, it may require that the agent be able to 
grade offenses as greater and lesser. So a recognitional capacity should 
perhaps include a rough gradeability capacity. But it is not clear that the 
fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing requires any very subtle or sophis-
ticated form of legal or moral understanding. 
 We might contrast refined morality and basic morality. Refined moral-
ity can be delicate, requiring a keen appreciation of the needs and signals 
of others and a deft touch. However, much of morality requires fairly 
basic honesty, cooperation, fidelity, restraint, and fair play and a capac-
ity for moral triage. The requirements of the criminal law are even more 
elemental. Two points are worth making in light of this contrast. First, 
our focus here is on basic morality and the criminal law, whose demands 
are fairly similar. The cognitive capacities necessary to recognize basic 
morality and the criminal law will be more modest than those necessary 
to recognize refined morality. Second, even if we shift focus to refined 
morality, it is not clear why this should induce us to switch from recogni-
tion to appreciation. The norms of refined morality may be more complex 
or subtle than those of basic morality, which would affect the capacities 
necessary for recognizing the norms in question, but there is no apparent 
reason that this should affect the sort of cognitive relation the agent should 
bear to these norms. These considerations suggest caution about embrac-
ing an appreciation standard that is significantly more demanding than a 
recognitional standard, especially if we focus on basic morality and the 
criminal law. The fair opportunity conception of responsibility seems to 
require only a recognitional capacity and perhaps a gradeability capacity.
 So far, the fair opportunity conception of responsibility supports the 
more inclusive Model Penal Code conception of insanity, in preference to 
the conceptually more restrictive M’Naghten conception. But now I want 
to consider two ways in which that conception of responsibility might call 
18
for reform of the MPC conception of insanity. The first requires broaden-
ing the MPC insanity conception; the second requires narrowing it.
 Like M’Naghten and all other proposed insanity tests, the Model 
Penal Code restricts the insanity defense to wrongdoing that results from 
incapacity “due to mental disease or defect.” Call this the mental disease 
requirement. On one reading of this requirement, it is a further condition 
beyond the relevant kind of incapacity, yielding a smaller class of excuses 
than the simple appeal to incapacity would. However, according to the 
fair opportunity conception of responsibility, significant impairment of 
normative competence is excusing. This generates the worry that the MPC 
conception of insanity, with its mental disease requirement, is too narrow 
to serve as a general incompetence excuse. This would not be a problem if 
insanity was just one form of incompetence among others recognized by 
the criminal law. For then forms of incompetence not meeting the mental 
disease requirement could be excused on grounds other than insanity. The 
problem is that insanity is the only incompetence excuse that American 
criminal law recognizes. Criminal law conceptualizes incompetence 
as insanity. But then if there are forms of incompetence that would not 
be recognized by the Model Penal Code, because of its mental disease 
requirement, there is reason to regard the MPC conception of insanity as 
an under-inclusive incompetence excuse.
 Whether this is a real problem for the Model Penal Code depends on 
how we understand the mental disease requirement. The problem is real if 
the mental disease requirement is supposed to function as an independent 
requirement, one constrained by independent psychiatric criteria. This 
would be to treat the concept of mental illness as a diagnostic clinical 
category, perhaps drawing its evidence from the current version of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.23 This clinical 
reading of the mental illness requirement would further limit the larger 
class of normative incapacity to the proper subclass of those whose norma-
tive incompetence is the product of clinically recognized mental illness 
or defect, and this would give rise to the worry that the MPC insanity test 
represents an under-inclusive incompetence excuse.
 Alternatively, we might interpret the mental disease requirement 
as having no independent significance. Perhaps any form of significant 
normative incompetence qualifies as a mental illness. This would be to 
treat the concept of mental illness, for purposes of the Model Penal Code, 
as a forensic category. If so, there is no problem of under-inclusiveness, 
because the mental illness requirement is not an independent requirement 
above and beyond the incompetence requirement. The mental illness 
requirement, on this forensic reading, does not pick out a proper subset 
of the class of normative incompetence.
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 It is unclear how exactly we are supposed to understand the mental 
disease requirement for purposes of the Model Penal Code and, in par-
ticular, whether we should understand it as a clinical or forensic category. 
Of course, psychiatric evidence will be relevant on either reading of the 
requirement — on the clinical reading, as evidence that the defendant 
had a bona fide mental disease over and above her incompetence, on 
the forensic reading, as evidence that she is normatively incompetent. 
I suspect that most consumers of the Model Penal Code understand the 
requirement as a clinical category.24 If so, we should treat its conception 
of insanity as only a proper part of an incompetence excuse. This would 
be reason to abolish the insanity test and replace it with a more general 
incompetence test that would include both cognitive and volitional com-
petence. Traditional abolitionists are hard abolitionists, because they seek 
to remove the excuse provided by the insanity defense. By contrast, the 
form of abolitionism that the fair opportunity conception of responsibility 
favors is soft abolitionism, inasmuch as it rejects the clinical interpretation 
of the mental disease requirement in the insanity defense and argues for 
a broader excuse of normative incompetence.
 The Model Penal Code test is potentially too narrow in another way 
as well. Recall that the second clause in its conception of insanity states 
that the required mental disease or defect should not be understood to 
“include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or other-
wise anti-social conduct” (§4.01). This is a reasonable requirement if it 
requires independent evidence of incapacity beyond the wrongdoing in 
question. Moreover, this independent evidence should presumably include 
psychiatric evidence beyond that contained in the defendant’s criminal 
record. But the clause surely goes too far in claiming that the evidence for 
incapacity cannot include the person’s record of social deviance. A suf-
ficiently consistent record of social deviance, criminal and non-criminal, 
would be evidence of significant impairment of normative competence 
and would raise serious questions about whether the agent was moder-
ately reasons-responsive. So this second clause in the MPC conception 
of insanity should be dropped.
 If the Model Penal Code conception of insanity is too narrow in these 
ways, it is in another way too broad. For its conception of insanity treats 
normative incompetence as sufficient for an incompetence excuse. Though 
in many cases normative incompetence of the relevant kind should be 
sufficient for an excuse, not in all cases. In particular, in cases in which 
the agent is herself responsible for becoming incompetent, it seems she 
should not be afforded an excuse. Consider someone who suffers from a 
kind of mental defect that renders her normatively incompetent but that 
can be effectively treated with medication. Assume that she is normatively 
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competent when she is on her medication but that, while competent, she 
chooses to stop taking her medication, rendering her, in due course, in-
competent. By hypothesis, she would not be competent at the time of her 
wrongdoing and so would qualify for the insanity defense if incompetence 
were sufficient for that excuse. Presumably, we want to say that the insanity 
or incompetence excuse should be unavailable to wrongdoers even if they 
were incompetent at the time of their wrongdoing if they were competent 
and, hence, responsible for becoming incompetent.
 This would introduce into the criminal law doctrine of insanity a 
restriction on the availability of the excuse when the agent is responsible 
for what would otherwise be excusing conditions. This would be to treat 
insanity similar to the way in which the Model Penal Code treats voluntary 
intoxication and self-induced duress (§§2.08(4)-(5)(b) and 2.09). Consider 
its account of the excuse of duress, which denies situational control, rather 
than normative competence.
(1) It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the 
conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced 
to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against 
his person or the person of another, which a person of reason-
able firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. 
(2) The defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the 
actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was 
probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is 
also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a 
situation, whenever negligence suffices to establish culpability 
for the offense charged [§2.09].
In effect, the Model Penal Code denies the excuse of duress when an agent 
who is otherwise subject to duress is responsible for her own duress. Its 
account of incompetence should be parallel, denying an excuse of incom-
petence to an agent who is otherwise incompetent but is responsible for 
her own incompetence.25
 If we were to draft an insanity test inspired by the Model Penal Code 
that could nonetheless serve as a general incompetence excuse, it might 
read something like this, as a first approximation.
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time 
of such conduct she lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate 
the criminality or wrongfulness of her conduct or to conform her 
conduct to these norms.
21
(2) This defense is not available to wrongdoers even if they 
were incompetent at the time of their wrongdoing if they were 
competent and, hence, responsible with respect to becoming 
incompetent. 
Some such conception of incompetence incorporates the virtues of the 
Model Penal Code, while correcting for the respects in which its concep-
tion of excuse is both too narrow and too broad. It is the sort of incompe-
tence excuse supported by the fair opportunity conception of responsibility.
4. Psychopathy
 In light of the fair opportunity conception of responsibility and excuse, 
in particular, its conception of incompetence, we are now in a position to 
inquire whether psychopathy should be excusing and, if so, why or how. 
To address this issue, we also need to know something about the nature of 
psychopathy. Despite decades of research by psychologists, psychiatrists, 
cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and criminologists, there is still much 
that is not known or that is contested about psychopathy, for instance, 
about its etiology and neuroanatomy. In what follows, I will try to focus 
on the syndrome of personality traits and behavior that is best understood 
and most directly relevant to assessments of normative competence.26
 Psychopathy is thought to depend on endogenous neurological and 
personality factors, even if its psychological and behavioral expression 
can sometimes be affected by nurture, education, and other environmental 
factors. Psychopathic personality and behavior in adults is usually trace-
able back to childhood, with adult onset both rare and contested. Hervey 
Cleckley’s pioneering work on psychopathy in The Mask of Sanity (1941) 
has been extremely influential and remains helpful. It is noteworthy that 
Cleckley’s clinical observations included both unsuccessful or criminal 
psychopaths and so-called successful psychopaths whose deviance did not 
include criminal behavior or who had not been caught and convicted for 
criminal behavior. As the title of Cleckley’s book suggests, he was struck 
by the superficial appearance of normalcy in most psychopaths. Unlike 
familiar forms of mental illness that might qualify for an insanity defense, 
psychopaths do not usually present as obviously mentally disturbed. They 
are not delusional, incoherent, unusually anxious, or especially prone to 
suicide. In fact, psychopaths are usually quite intelligent and articulate and 
display superficial social skills and even charm. But if one looks beneath 
this veneer and examines their history, psychopaths display similar person-
ality traits and behavior. They tend to be egocentric and to have shallow 
affect or emotion and little insight into the emotional lives of others; they 
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are insincere and untruthful; and they lack remorse for their wrongdoing. 
These traits lead to various behavioral problems. They regularly engage in 
antisocial behavior that causes hardship to others; this antisocial behavior 
is typically inadequately motivated and imprudent; they fail to learn by 
experience from their mistakes; their behavior is aimless and displays no 
life plan; and they are unable to sustain lasting and satisfying interpersonal 
relationships.27
 Building on Cleckley’s work, Robert Hare developed an extremely 
influential diagnostic tool for psychopathy — the Hare Psychopathy 
Checklist — Revised (PCL-R).28 Developed in prison populations, it 
purports to be a general psychopathy construct but is perhaps best suited 
for diagnosing criminal psychopathy. The PCL-R tests the following traits 
and behaviors.
1. Glibness/superficial charm
2. Grandiose sense of self-worth
3. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom
4. Pathological lying
5. Conning/manipulative
6. Lack of remorse or guilt
7. Shallow affect
8. Callous/lack of empathy
9. Parasitic lifestyle
10. Poor behavioral controls
11. Promiscuous sexual behavior
12. Early behavior problems
13. Lack of realistic, long-term goals
14. Impulsivity
15. Irresponsibility
16. Failure to accept responsibility for one’s own actions
17. Many short-term marital relationships
18. Juvenile delinquency
19. Revocation of conditional release
20. Criminal versatility
The test is administered by trained professionals based on an extensive 
review of the subject’s file and a structured interview. For each item, a 
subject will be scored between 0 and 2 points, with total scores ranging be-
tween 0 and 40 points. Adults scoring above 30 are deemed determinately 
psychopathic; those scoring below 20 points are deemed determinately 
non-psychopathic. The PCL-R was originally conceptualized as a two-
factor model of psychopathy consisting of interpersonal and affective items 
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and impulsive and anti-social lifestyle items.29 The PCL-R has proven 
extremely useful at predicting recidivism rates among criminal offenders 
and so is increasingly being used for purposes of assessing suitability for 
parole and early release programs.
 One important aspect of ongoing research on the nature of psychopa-
thy involves distinguishing it from other sorts of psychological disorders. 
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
recognizes Conduct Disorder as a pattern of persistent conduct in which 
the rights of others or other social norms are violated (DSM-5 pp. 469-
71). Individuals who are adults with CD and have a history of CD tracing 
back to adolescence are diagnosed with Antisocial Personality Disorder 
(ASPD) (§301.7).30 Though both CD and ASPD include psychopathic 
factors, neither requires the full range of psychopathic factors. In fact, CD 
and ASPD can cover many different kinds of antisocial behavior, many 
of which do not seem to threaten normative competence or justify an in-
sanity or incompetence defense. However, psychopathy is a special case, 
worth distinguishing from this larger class. Recent work on psychopathy 
suggests several distinguishing marks of psychopathy.31
1. ASPD and CD can involve reactive aggression in which the 
subject responds with disproportionate anger and aggres-
sion to some kind of provocation. By contrast, psychopathy 
involves instrumental aggression in which the subject uses 
aggression to get what he wants, regardless of the importance 
or stability of these objectives.
2. Many individuals with CD experience guilt or remorse in 
response to the wrongs and harms they commit. By contrast, 
psychopaths do not experience guilt or remorse, typically 
blaming their victims.
3. ASPD need not involve significant emotional deficits. By 
contrast, psychopaths display shallow affect. They have 
significant empathy deficits; they tend to display low situ-
ational social anxiety, as measured by electrodermal tests; 
and they display little fear and have difficulty with aversive 
learning in which behavior is modified in response to the 
prospect of punishment for noncompliance.
4. Psychopaths are alleged to have trouble distinguishing 
moral and conventional norms, where moral norms, unlike 
conventional norms, are supposed to be serious, invariant, 
and not conditional on local authorities and taboos.
5. ASPD and reactive aggression often involve prefrontal cor-
tex damage; psychopathy often involves amygdala damage.
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So, there is some consensus about the distinctive features of psychopathy. 
It is typified by a syndrome of personality and behavioral traits. Though 
superficially normal in intelligence and affect, psychopaths tend to have 
shallow affect and deficits in empathy, anxiety, and fear. They tend to be 
impulsive, engaging in dangerous and imprudent behavior, often for fleet-
ing or insubstantial purposes. They do not pursue long-term objectives or 
life-plans. They are manipulative and pathological liars, using aggression 
instrumentally and experiencing little or no remorse for the harm they 
cause others. They are not able to sustain lasting interpersonal relation-
ships. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of psychopathy is that there is 
no good evidence of any effective form of treatment.32 However, some 
consolation can be taken in the fact that the careers of psychopaths tend 
to be limited, with the antisocial behavioral expressions of psychopathy 
dropping sharply after the age of 40.33 Until we are better able to docu-
ment the neuropsychological deficits of psychopaths and devise surgical 
or pharmacological interventions or provide effective behavioral therapies, 
diagnoses of psychopathy will mainly be relevant to blocking the early 
release of psychopathic criminals and perhaps justifying civil commitment 
for especially dangerous psychopaths, at least until such time as they are 
no longer a significant threat to others.
 
5. Psychopathy, Incompetence, and Excuse
 We are now in a better position to address the question whether and, 
if so, why psychopathy provides a legal or moral excuse. As I noted at the 
outset, views are mixed about whether psychopathy excuses. On the one 
hand, psychopathy is not recognized as an excuse under existing insanity 
doctrine, and many would regard psychopathy as an aggravating, rather 
than a mitigating, factor. The psychopath’s apparent indifference to the 
suffering of others and lack of remorse for the wrongs he commits and 
harms he causes may seem to make him more deserving of blame and 
punishment. On the other hand, several philosophers and legal academics 
have argued that we should recognize psychopathy as an excusing con-
dition. Because some of them have argued or implied that psychopaths 
have impaired normative competence, their arguments engage the fair 
opportunity conception of responsibility and excuse that I have developed 
here.
 One reason that psychopathy is not recognized as a legitimate insanity 
defense may be that it is not recognized as a distinct personality disor-
der in the DSM, and all extant insanity tests require that the incapacity 
be the product of a mental disease or defect.34 If we conceptualize that 
requirement as involving a distinct clinical diagnosis over and above the 
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incapacity itself, that might explain reluctance to recognize psychopathy 
as a form of insanity. While this might explain reluctance to recognize 
an insanity defense for psychopathy, it would not be a good justification 
of that reluctance. For one thing, there is significant consensus, as we 
have seen, that psychopathy is an empirically valid construct, which is 
both narrower and more pathological than ASPD, which is not thought to 
involve sufficient incompetence to warrant an insanity defense. Moreover, 
we saw that for purposes of assessing responsibility and excuse we should 
understand mental disease or defect as a forensic category that is not in-
dependent of normative incompetence. This is why the fair opportunity 
conception of the incompetence excuse drops the requirement that norma-
tive incompetence be the product of mental disease or defect, provided 
only that the agent is not herself responsible for being incompetent.
  Gary Watson offers one rationale for excusing wrongdoing by 
psychopaths. In “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a 
Strawsonian Theme”35 Watson discusses the case of Robert Harris, who 
had a long history of aggression and cruelty and was convicted for kill-
ing two boys as part of a carjacking. Harris expressed no remorse for the 
killings and in fact seemed to enjoy the suffering of his victims.36 It is not 
known whether Harris was a psychopath, but much of his personal history 
suggests that he might well have been. After noting our revulsion toward 
characters, such as Harris, Watson suggests that their failure to recognize 
and respond to basic moral considerations may place them outside the 
community of participants in the reactive attitudes. This is a theme he 
develops and applies in particular to psychopathy in “The Trouble with 
Psychopaths.”37 While acknowledging that psychopaths display a disregard 
for the interests of others that allows us to attribute wrongdoing to them, 
Watson expresses doubts about their accountability for wrongdoing. He 
claims that psychopaths are constitutionally disqualified as members of 
the moral community because they are “unreachable by the language of 
moral address.” What needs explanation here is what would make psy-
chopaths beyond the scope of moral address. The explanation required by 
the fair opportunity conception of responsibility and apparently endorsed 
by Watson is that psychopaths lack normative competence, in particular, 
the ability to recognize and respond to reasons, especially moral reasons. 
But whereas Watson assumes that psychopaths lack normative competence 
or, at least, moral competence, this is an issue we need to investigate.
  We have conceptualized normative competence as involving both 
cognitive capacities — the ability to make normative discriminations 
and recognize wrongdoing — and volitional capacities — the ability to 
conform one’s actions to this normative knowledge. Some early work 
on psychopathy suggested that it compromises volitional, rather than 
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cognitive, competence.38 On the volitional interpretation of psychopa-
thy, psychopaths recognize what they should do but have affective or 
motivational problems acting on their normative beliefs and regulating 
their behavior as they recognize they ought. However, this view of psy-
chopathy as involving volitional deficits has given way to the view that 
it involves primarily cognitive deficits. On this cognitive interpretation 
of psychopathy, psychopaths lack the ability to make suitable normative 
discriminations and recognize wrongdoing.
6. Cognitive Incompetence? 
 This cognitive interpretation of psychopathic deficits fits with the 
common observation that psychopathy involves a kind of normative or 
moral blindness akin to color blindness in which psychopaths just don’t 
perceive normative, especially moral, issues the same way that normals 
do.39 It also fits with the claims of moral philosophers and criminal law 
theorists who advocate recognizing a M’Naghten-style excuse for psy-
chopathy.40 However, this cognitive conclusion is more often asserted than 
defended. It merits more careful assessment. 
 The most complete defense of a M’Naghten-style excuse for psy-
chopathy of which I am aware is that offered by Cordelia Fine and Jean-
nette Kennett in their article “Mental Impairment, Moral Understanding 
and Criminal Responsibility: Psychopathy and the Purposes of Punish-
ment.”41 They accept, at least for purposes of argument, a M’Naghten-
style conception of excuse as limited to cognitive incompetence, in part 
because this is a feature of the Australian criminal code that they want 
their arguments to engage.42 They claim that the ability to know or ap-
preciate that an act is legally wrong requires moral, and not just legal, 
understanding. Thus, they conclude that criminal cognitive competence 
requires moral cognitive competence. Fine and Kennett then defend the 
claim that psychopaths lack basic moral cognitive competence — the 
idea that psychopaths are morally blind — by appeal to psychological 
deficits exhibited in psychopathy — the alleged inability of psychopaths 
to distinguish between conventional and moral norms and their affective 
deficits, in particular, their empathy and fear deficits. This is the right kind 
of argument. The question is whether it is compelling. Closer inspection, 
I think, reveals some grounds for skepticism.
 The fair opportunity conception of responsibility insists that norma-
tive competence and, in particular, cognitive competence is necessary for 
responsibility. This implies that the ability to recognize moral wrongdoing 
is a necessary condition of moral competence and, hence, moral responsi-
bility. So if psychopathy compromises cognitive moral competence, this 
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raises serious questions about whether psychopaths should be held mor-
ally responsible. But it is less clear that moral competence is necessary 
for criminal responsibility. Criminal responsibility, we said, would seem 
to involve a kind of normative competence to recognize and conform to 
norms of the criminal law. Criminal law doctrines of insanity sometimes 
fudge this issue by insisting only that the agent had the ability to recog-
nize or appreciate that her conduct was wrong. This leaves unspecified 
whether the norms whose violation is in question are criminal or moral. 
But the criminal law only punishes violations of the criminal law, not 
moral wrongs per se. This is why many (but not all) jurisdictions that ad-
dress the ambiguity specify that the focus should be on the capacity for 
recognizing criminal wrongdoing. 
 One might distinguish criminal and moral forms of normative compe-
tence in this way and still claim that criminal competence requires moral 
competence. One might concede that there could be a bare recognitional 
capacity for criminal wrongdoing that did not presuppose moral com-
petence but insist that a proper appreciation of why conduct is criminal 
requires understanding the moral basis for its criminalization. This line 
of argument emphasizes the Model Penal Code’s insistence that criminal 
responsibility requires the agent be able to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct. It contrasts the sort of thin recognitional capacity required 
by M’Naghten with a thicker one required by the MPC.  
 There are complicated issues here. First, it is not obvious why criminal 
responsibility should require a thick, rather than a thin, ability to recognize 
criminality. Why isn’t it enough if the agent was able to recognize that his 
conduct was illegal and had the ability to conform to the requirements? 
Why must the agent also be able to appreciate or understand why that 
conduct is criminal? Second, even if cognitive competence requires appre-
ciation and a thicker recognitional capacity, it is not clear that appreciation 
of criminal wrongdoing requires moral understanding. Perhaps it only 
requires, in addition to recognizing criminal offenses, some appreciation 
of the comparative seriousness of various criminal offenses in the form 
of a rough ability to grade criminal offenses. Perhaps moral competence 
would be helpful in performing such comparative assessments, but it is not 
clear why it should be necessary. Criminal offenses might be graded by 
the severity of the sanction for noncompliance, which would not require 
moral competence. 
 The case for thinking that criminal cognitive competence requires 
moral cognitive competence has not yet been made. Consequently, we 
might want to keep the sort of cognitive competence required for criminal 
responsibility and for moral responsibility distinct. This may affect the 
sort of excuse that we think psychopaths might have available to them.
28
7. The Moral/Conventional Distinction
 Fine and Kennett appeal to frequently cited studies claiming that 
psychopaths have trouble discriminating between moral and conventional 
norms. Elliott Turiel and colleagues found that psychological normals dis-
tinguish consistently and reliably between conduct that is morally wrong 
and conduct that is wrong by virtue of social convention.43 Turiel’s test 
depends on the idea that, in contrast with conventional transgressions, 
moral wrongs are (1) are independent of local authority, (2) involve harm, 
rights violations, or unfairness, (3) are temporally and geographically in-
variant, and (4) are more serious. Moral prohibitions on murder or assault 
score higher on all four dimensions than rules of mere etiquette. Turiel 
found that the ability to make the moral-conventional distinction was 
well established even in very young children, who distinguish between 
moral prohibitions on hitting classmates and conventional requirements 
of classroom etiquette. In two studies, James Blair applied Turiel’s Moral-
Conventional Transgressions task (MCT) to subjects in prison populations 
and mental hospitals who had high scores on the PCL-R, concluding that 
psychopaths cannot discriminate reliably between moral and conventional 
norms and treat moral norms as if they were conventional norms.44 Fine 
and Kennett appeal to these results to suggest that psychopaths lack moral 
concepts and competence. This would tend to show that psychopaths lack 
the competence necessary for moral responsibility. If, as Fine and Kennett 
allege, criminal responsibility requires moral cognitive competence, then 
these results would also tend to show that psychopaths lack the competence 
necessary for criminal responsibility.
 However, there are several places in this argument to express skep-
ticism. For one thing, we have already questioned the assumption that 
criminal responsibility requires moral competence. If Fine and Kennett 
were right that psychopaths lack moral concepts and competence, this 
would help show that they were not morally responsible, which is itself 
an interesting and important conclusion. But this wouldn’t show that psy-
chopaths weren’t criminally responsible. After all, on most jurisprudential 
views, there is an important conventional element in the law, because laws 
depend on the relevant kind of social and institutional enactment. So, even 
if psychopaths treated moral norms as if they were conventional norms, 
this would not interfere with their ability to recognize legal norms, which 
are conventional in character.
 Also, one might question the philosophical presuppositions of Turiel’s 
work. The MCT seems to presuppose a sharp distinction between moral 
norms, which are historically and culturally invariant and authority-
independent, and conventional norms, which are historically and cultur-
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ally variable and authority-dependent. But some metaethical views might 
question this contrast. Some moral conventionalists or constructivists 
believe that moral requirements are the product of an agreement and 
can be culturally variable.45 Others see some, if not all, moral demands 
as demands that agents make on each other, rendering these demands in 
some sense authority-dependent.46 Though I am not especially sympathetic 
to these metaethical views,47 we should be wary of empirical work if it 
depends on contested metaethical commitments. Whether Turiel’s work 
does so depend is not clear. It requires distinguishing norms of etiquette 
that can depend on quite local and arbitrary authorities, with the result 
that the normative valence of conduct can be changed by fiat, and moral 
norms that are not similarly dependent and variable. One might well ac-
cept this contrast even if one thought moral norms were conventional or 
authority-dependent at some more fundamental level and in some less 
arbitrary way. For this reason, I think it is unclear if Turiel’s MCT is 
philosophically problematic. 
 The bigger worry, I think, is not Turiel’s distinction, but Blair’s use 
of it.48 In Blair’s studies, psychopaths failed to distinguish moral and con-
ventional norms along three of the four dimensions the MCT identified. 
Psychopaths did cite authorities in explaining why violations of moral 
and conventional norms are wrong (roughly, both are wrong just because 
they violate rules), whereas normals cited harm and rights-violations 
as the reasons that moral transgressions are wrong. But otherwise they 
scored moral and conventional transgressions similarly, saying both were 
impermissible and serious wrongs. A more natural interpretation of these 
findings is that psychopaths treated conventional norms as if they were 
moral norms. In other words, it is not so much that psychopaths assimilate 
moral norms to conventional ones as that they assimilate conventional 
norms to moral ones. Blair defended his interpretation of the results as 
fitting his hypothesis that psychopaths lack moral concepts by claiming 
that the reason they treated conventional norms so seriously is that they 
wanted to manipulate experimenters by telling them what the psychopaths 
thought they wanted to hear. In recent experiments designed to eliminate 
incentives for insincere reports, psychopathic offenders were not found to 
be any worse at distinguishing moral and conventional norms than non-
psychopathic offenders.49 Moreover, in related experiments, psychopaths 
were shown to track normal comparisons of the seriousness of offenses 
ranging from cruel murders, to simple theft, to prostitution, to dishonesty.50 
These experiments suggest that psychopaths have normal abilities to 
recognize moral wrongdoing and to grade offenses for their seriousness. 
 The claim that psychopaths lack moral concepts and, hence, moral 
competence, because they treat moral norms as if they were conventional 
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norms does not hold up well to closer inspection. The original studies do 
not support the conclusion that psychopaths have an impoverished concep-
tion of morality, rather than an inflated conception of conventional norms. 
Further experiments designed to distinguish these two interpretations show 
that psychopaths can distinguish moral and conventional requirements as 
well as non-psychopaths. In fact, these studies cast considerable doubt on 
the proposition that psychopaths lack moral concepts and moral compe-
tence. But then the literature on psychopathy and the moral/conventional 
distinction does not support a finding of cognitive incompetence that 
would provide a M’Naghten-style excuse for psychopaths.
8. Affective Deficits
 Fine and Kennett also appeal to well documented affective deficits 
in psychopaths — involving empathy, fear, and situational anxiety — in 
support of their cognitive incompetence. One might wonder how an 
emotional deficit would establish a cognitive deficit. But one might well 
claim that empathy for victims and fear of sanctions for noncompliance 
are essential to learning moral norms and to detecting when they apply. In 
this way affective deficits might be a source of cognitive incompetence.
 Consider empathy first. The most important norms of morality and 
law are concerned with harm prevention, and empathy is a normal way for 
us to detect when our behavior is harmful and wrong and a normal way 
for us to be motivated not to harm others. The first fact about empathy 
represents it as having a role upstream from normative cognition and so 
potentially relevant to cognitive capacity, whereas the second fact about 
empathy represents it as having a role downstream from normative cogni-
tion and so potentially relevant to volitional capacity. Insofar as we are 
here concerned with the effect of psychopathy on cognitive competence, 
we are interested in this first epistemic role of empathy. 
 Do empathy deficits fund a M’Naghten-style excuse for cognitive 
incapacity? It is plausible to suppose that empathy can be an epistemi-
cally useful resource in moral recognition. But it doesn’t follow from 
this fact alone that empathy is necessary for moral concepts or making 
moral discriminations. There could be other modes of access to moral 
knowledge and recognition of wrongdoing. It seems I could know that 
causing death or bodily injury is harmful and, hence, wrong even if I 
didn’t experience these facts empathetically. I could come to know these 
facts propositionally, rather than empathetically, and I could accept the 
authority of other members of my community about what actions were 
right and wrong, whether or not I had empathetic understanding of the 
harms caused to others by my wrongdoing. So, if the question is whether 
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I have the capacity to recognize moral wrongdoing, empathy might be 
useful, but it does not seem necessary. If so, the psychopath’s empathy 
deficits do not yet provide an excuse.
 Cognitive capacity is sometimes analogized to a perceptual capac-
ity, and, as we have seen, some are willing to count psychopathy as a 
form of moral or criminal blindness. We might explore the value of these 
metaphors by thinking about colorblindness. Colorblind people, let us 
assume, are unable to distinguish between red and green. We might ask 
whether their incapacity provides them with an excuse for failing to obey 
traffic laws requiring them to stop their vehicles at red lights. It is true that 
the colorblind cannot experience the difference between red and green 
and so cannot rely on these normal visual cues to recognize vehicular 
wrongdoing. But there are other ways of recognizing when the traffic 
light is red. The red light is the top light in a vertical display, whereas the 
green light is the bottom light (in a horizontal display, the red is leftmost 
and the green is rightmost), and colorblindness does not interfere with 
this sort of positional recognition. But this suggests that colorblindness 
would not excuse vehicular wrongdoing, because even if it deprives an 
agent of one familiar form of epistemic access to the facts in question, it 
leaves available other modes of access. Similarly, we might think that a 
systematic lack of empathy might deprive psychopaths of one familiar 
form of epistemic access to the harmful and wrongful nature of their ac-
tions, but it wouldn’t thereby deprive them of other forms of access to 
this information. One could learn that murder and rape were harmful and 
wrong without needing to identify them as wrong empathetically.51
 One might argue that empathy doesn’t have to be necessary for moral 
knowledge for empathy deficits to excuse. If empathy is for normal agents 
a reliable way of acquiring moral knowledge, then lack of empathy might 
make the task of acquiring moral knowledge harder, even if it does not 
make it impossible. As Joseph Newman describes it,
Whereas most people automatically anticipate the consequences 
of their actions, automatically feel shame for unkind deeds, 
automatically understand why they should persist in the face of 
frustration, automatically distrust propositions that are too good 
to be true, and are automatically aware of their commitments 
to others, psychopaths may only become aware of such factors 
with effort.52
If so, empathy deficits might still seem to excuse. But a deficit can make the 
acquisition of moral knowledge harder than it would otherwise be without 
making it hard (simpliciter), and even if the empathy deficit makes the 
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acquisition of moral knowledge hard (and not just harder), it is not clear 
that it makes it so hard as to deprive the psychopath of the fair opportunity 
to avoid wrongdoing. After all, if the psychopath has these other sources 
of moral knowledge, that might be opportunity enough. Not everyone 
finds it equally easy to avoid wrongdoing for a variety of reasons. Some 
situations pose more hardship for everyone than other situations, and some 
people experience more hardship in some situations than other people do. 
Many comparative difficulties don’t rise to the level as to undermine the 
fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing and, hence, don’t serve as the basis 
for excuse. Unless empathy deficits substantially interfere with the ability 
of psychopaths to make normative discriminations, it is hard to see how 
such deficits could fund a M’Naghten-style excuse. 
 Though empathy may plausibly play an upstream role in normative 
cognition in normals, it does not follow that empathy is necessary for 
cognitive competence in a way that would excuse psychopaths by virtue of 
their empathy deficits. In fact, recent work on psychopathic performance 
on the MCT and on grading the seriousness of offenses strongly suggests 
that psychopaths do have normative knowledge. But what is actual must 
be possible. If so, psychopaths appear to be cognitively competent, at 
least with respect to the requirements of basic morality and the criminal 
law.53 This does not address the downstream role of empathy in relation 
to normative cognition, which bears on the volitional, rather than the 
cognitive, dimensions of normative competence. 
 Another affective deficit that psychopaths possess involves fear. 
Because fear is thought be an essential component of aversive learning, 
Fine and Kennett reason that a lack of fear would interfere with normal 
ways of learning the importance of legal and moral concepts. But this 
appeal to fear deficits to support cognitive incompetence also moves too 
fast. Psychopaths clearly find imprisonment disagreeable and are keen to 
be out of prison as soon as possible. It may be that they do not anticipate 
the disagreeable consequences of misconduct as much as they should 
or that this recognition does not operate as it should to produce impulse 
control. But this does not mean that they can’t recognize intellectually 
that they risk unpleasant consequences when they engage in wrongdoing. 
Moreover, we should distinguish between norms, whether criminal or 
moral, and sanctions that might be attached for noncompliance. A failure 
to fear sanctions might affect one’s motives for noncompliance, but there 
is no reason it should prevent one from recognizing the norms of conduct, 
especially when one sees others conforming to these norms and fearful of 
sanctions for noncompliance. Studies showing that psychopaths do make 
normative discriminations similar to normals suggest that their fear deficits 
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play a downstream, rather than an upstream, role in relation to normative 
cognition. 
9. Volitional Incompetence?
 Those who have treated psychopathy as excusing have tended to as-
sume that psychopathy undermines cognitive competence. Those who have 
argued for this claim have appealed to alleged trouble psychopaths have 
distinguishing moral and conventional norms and their affective deficits, 
especially involving empathy and fear. But there is no good evidence that 
psychopaths cannot distinguish moral and conventional norms, and they 
seem quite reliable in grading the seriousness of offenses. Psychopaths 
do have affective deficits in empathy and fear. But these deficits do not 
prevent the formation of moral concepts and the ability to recognize moral 
and criminal norms. If so, we have no reason to accept a M’Naghten-style 
excuse for cognitive incompetence for psychopathic wrongdoing. Empiri-
cal work on the nature of psychopathy is continuing and evolving, so it 
would be foolish to assume that this verdict could not change as we learn 
more about the cognitive capacities of psychopaths. But for now I think 
we should be skeptical about whether psychopathy excuses on cognitive 
grounds. If we were to accept a purely cognitive conception of responsi-
bility and excuse, then this verdict would settle (for now) the question of 
whether psychopathy should excuse.
 However, the fair opportunity conception of responsibility also rec-
ognizes a volitional dimension of responsibility and, hence, excuses based 
on volitional impairment. The question is whether psychopathy signifi-
cantly impairs an agent’s ability to conform her conduct to her normative 
knowledge. Here, the downstream role of empathy and fear deficits might 
be relevant, explaining why psychopaths are not more reliably moved to 
care about the harm they cause or to fear sanctions for noncompliance with 
moral and criminal norms. It is a distinctive feature of psychopathy that 
psychopaths are impulsive and often impose substantial costs on others 
and take substantial risks themselves for insubstantial and even whimsical 
ends. If they are able to recognize the relevant norms, this suggests a pos-
sible volitional, rather than cognitive, impairment.54 Failures of empathy 
and fear might contribute to impulsive and undisciplined transgression 
of moral and criminal norms. 
 It is reasonably plausible that psychopaths do have volitional control 
problems of some sort. They do not seem to care enough about what they 
often recognize to be wrongdoing. Moreover, their moral and criminal 
transgressions are often spectacularly imprudent, suggesting that they 
cannot even bother to care about themselves. But the crucial and difficult 
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question is whether their failure to conform to the relevant norms rep-
resents a genuine incapacity to conform. Is it just that they often won’t 
conform to norms that they recognize or that they can’t? To distinguish 
can’t and won’t, we need to see if psychopaths are moderately reasons-
responsive. It is clear that they conform their behavior to the reasons they 
recognize less often than normals do. But just as occasional weakness of 
will in normals does not show that they lack volitional competence, the 
more common and significant failings of psychopaths to conform do not 
automatically show that they lack volitional competence. To show genuine 
volitional incompetence, we would have to have evidence of systemic 
control problems. It would not be enough to know that they failed to 
conform in the case in which they committed wrong or even that they 
failed to conform in other cases in the past. One would have to show that 
conformity was exceptional. But psychopaths often seem able to conform 
to relevant norms with new acquaintances and when they know they are 
being watched and evaluated. So there is reason to think that they do have 
some significant volitional competence. To assess this volitional rationale 
for excusing psychopaths we would require more empirical evidence about 
the decision-making histories of psychopaths and the extent and causes 
of their problems with impulse control. While the best prospects for an 
excuse for psychopathy might lie with studying the extent and nature 
of their volitional impairment, the present state of our knowledge about 
psychopathy does not provide a strong case for a volitional excuse. 
10. Conclusion
 The fair opportunity conception of responsibility factors responsibility 
into conditions of normative competence and situational control. Norma-
tive competence factors into cognitive and volitional capacities that are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for someone to count as a 
responsible agent. This supports a conception of insanity or incompetence 
that recognizes substantial impairment of either cognitive or volitional 
competence as excusing, provided the agent is not substantially responsible 
for her own incompetence. We can use this fair opportunity conception of 
responsibility and excuse to help frame the question whether and, if so, 
why psychopathy is excusing. The most common rationale for excusing 
psychopathy appeals to claims about cognitive incompetence. However, 
when this rationale is examined more closely, there are good philosophical 
and empirical reasons to be skeptical that psychopaths lack the relevant 
capacities to recognize and appreciate moral or criminal wrongdoing. 
There is more to be said for a volitional rationale for excuse. The crucial 
question here is whether the problems psychopaths have with impulse 
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control and conforming their behavior to the relevant moral and criminal 
norms are pervasive and systematic enough to demonstrate genuine vo-
litional incompetence. The available empirical evidence, I think, should 
leave us (defeasibly) skeptical about the merits of this volitional rationale 
for excuse. 
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